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Abstract
In this paper we hypothesize that education is associated with a higher efficiency of
health investment, yet that this efficiency advantage is solely driven by intelligence. We
operationalize efficiency of health investment as the probability of dying conditional on
a certain hospital diagnosis, and estimate a multistate structural equation model with
three states: (i) healthy, (ii) ill (in hospital), and (iii) death. We use data from a Dutch
cohort born around 1940 that links intelligence tests at age 12 to later-life hospitalization
and mortality records. The results suggest that higher intelligence induces the higher
educated to be more efficient users of health investment – intelligent individuals have a
clear survival advantage for most hospital diagnoses – yet for unanticipated health shocks
and diseases that require complex treatments such as COPD, education still plays a role.
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1 Introduction
Health disparities across educational groups are widespread, and – strikingly – grow-
ing over time (Meara et al. 2008). While there has been considerable progress in
recent years in unraveling the direction of causality, much less attention has been de-
voted to understanding the mechanisms through which the higher educated achieve
their health advantage. In fact, very little is known about why the higher edu-
cated are healthier than their less-educated peers (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008;
Mazumder, 2012).
One often-cited hypothesis is that the higher educated are more efficient pro-
ducers of health investment. This could be due to (i) “productive efficiency” or (ii)
“allocative efficiency”. The former hypothesis posits that higher education leads
to a higher marginal product of a given set of health inputs. In simple terms, the
higher educated understand the doctor better and use existing medical care more
efficiently. The allocative efficiency hypothesis on the other hand argues that higher
educated individuals choose different, more efficient inputs into health investment,
typically thought to be caused by better health knowledge and a more receptive
attitude towards new information.
While there is empirical evidence that higher educated individuals are more effi-
cient users of health investment in terms of both productive and allocative efficiency
(see Grossman, 2006 for an excellent review), it is not established whether this is
actually the result of education per se. This is surprising for two reasons. First,
much of the reasoning why higher educated individuals would be more efficient users
of health investment could equally hold for intelligence. For example, understanding
the doctor better and adhering to complex treatments may be driven by intelligence
rather than education.
Second, our reading of the literature on education and health outcomes is that
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at least half of the health disparities across educational groups is due to selection of
healthier, more able individuals into higher education (Conti and Heckman, 2010;
Conti et al. 2010; 2011; Bijwaard et al. 2013; Heckman et al. 2014).1 Hence, in
recent years evidence is growing that the presumed health returns to education may
be smaller than previously thought, which also raises the question to what extent it
is the actual attainment of education that improves health investment efficiency.
In this paper we aim to answer two questions. First: Is education associated
with a higher efficiency of health investment? We investigate the efficiency of health
investment by studying survival probabilities conditional on a certain hospital di-
agnosis. While the data do not permit disentangling productive from allocative
efficiency, the data do provide a unique opportunity to answer a second question:
To what extent is intelligence driving the potential efficiency gains associated with
education?
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to test the hypothesis that higher
intelligence gives the higher educated their efficiency advantage in terms of health
investment. Rejecting or non-rejecting this hypothesis has important policy impli-
cations. If educational attainment increases the efficiency of health investment then
learning itself and the associated improved knowledge have non-monetary returns
in terms of health and survival gains. If instead most of the efficiency gains derive
from intelligence, this suggests that supply-side interventions (e.g. longer consulta-
tion time, more explicit prescriptions for lower IQ individuals, or nudging) are more
1The reasoning is also corroborated by studies exploiting compulsory schooling reforms to es-
tablish the causal effect of education on health outcomes, which unanimously show that the causal
effect of education on health outcomes is either much smaller than the correlation suggests (Lleras-
Muney, 2005; Van Kippersluis et al. 2011; Meghir et al. 2013), or even entirely absent (Albouy
and Lequien, 2009; Clark and Royer, 2014).
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appropriate to reduce population disparities in health and survival.
The data used are from a Dutch cohort study of individuals born around 1940
that links intelligence tests at age 12 to follow-up surveys including education and
self-reported health in 1993. A unique feature of the data is that we have additionally
linked the data to administrative records regarding hospitalizations between 1995
and 2005 and mortality between 1995 and 2011. We use a theoretical model with
a health-state dependent utility function and endogenous length-of-life to formulate
hypotheses. Testing the theoretical hypotheses requires estimating a multistate
structural equation model with three states: (i) healthy, (ii) ill (in hospital), and
(iii) death. The empirical model allows testing our hypotheses by decomposing the
relative contributions of education and intelligence on the transitions between the
three states.
The results suggest that the higher educated are more efficient users of health
investment: they have a smaller probability to die within one year after hospital
admittance even conditional on self-reported health and previous diagnoses. How-
ever, when accounting for selection into education based on intelligence, most of
the efficiency gain is removed. It is mostly intelligent people who have a survival
advantage for a given hospital diagnosis. For females however we found a large
educational gain, even after accounting for selective education choice. For people
admitted to hospital with cancer, the probability to die does not differ by educa-
tion. Apparently, neither high education nor high intelligence helps you to survive
cancer. For people with respiratory diseases, like COPD and pneumonia, we found
large differences in survival by education even conditional on intelligence. In sum,
the survival advantage among higher educated individuals seems to derive largely
from intrinsic abilities like intelligence, yet education does have efficiency gains over
and above intelligence for diseases that require complex adherence regimens such as
COPD.
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This paper is structured as follows. The theoretical framework to structure
thoughts on the efficiency of health investment and the hypotheses are introduced
in Section 2. Section 3 presents the multistate structural equation model to test the
theoretical hypotheses. In Section 4 the Brabant data and the linked register data
on hospitalization and mortality from Statistics Netherlands is discussed. Section 5
presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes and provides a discussion of the
results.
2 Theoretical background
Efficiency of health investment In the seminal health capital model, Grossman
(1972) assumes that the health investment process is influenced by education E.2
Grossman motivated the inclusion of education by arguing that education increases
the efficiency of household production. Higher educated individuals have a higher
marginal product of the inputs into health investment, and hence education alters
the effective quantity of these inputs. This argument is referred to as “productive
efficiency” (Grossman, 1972; Michael and Becker, 1973). The alternative reason why
education appears in the health investment process is that it could alter the choice
of inputs altogether, typically thought to be caused by acquisition of health knowl-
edge. This hypothesis has become known as “allocative efficiency” (Rosenzweig and
Schultz, 1981; Muurinen, 1982).
Empirically distinguishing between the two alternative hypotheses is an ex-
tremely challenging task. Grossman (2006) proposes a test, by looking at the co-
2The dynamic equation for the health stock is given by Ht+1 −Ht = It[E]− dtHt, where H is
the health stock, I is health investment, d is the depreciation rate, and education E is labelled an
environmental variable instead of a factor input, since its use in the production does not diminish
its use in other production processes (Michael, 1973; see also Chiteji, 2010).
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efficient of education in a structural model of health as dependent variable and
all inputs into health production plus education as independent variables. In case
the coefficient of education is non-zero, this proves “productive efficiency” since even
with the universe of health production inputs, higher educated individuals still reach
a higher level of health. In case the coefficient is zero, this proves the “allocative
efficiency” hypothesis, since there will be no additional gain from education if all
health production inputs are controlled for.
Since it is very difficult, if not impossible, to observe all inputs into health pro-
duction, measure health comprehensively, and account for the simultaneous endo-
geneity of both health care use and education with respect to health, very few studies
have taken up this task. One of the few studies that have made a brave attempt
is Gilleskie and Harrison (1998), who estimated a structural production model for
self-reported health, and provide tentative evidence that suggests both productive
and allocative efficiency are at work. Kenkel (1991; 1995) provides evidence in favor
of productive efficiency.3
Given the complexity and heroic data requirements of separating productive and
allocative efficiency, we will not attempt to separate the two. Rather we investigate
whether education is associated with a higher efficiency of health investment, and
to what extent this potential efficiency gain is driven by intelligence. We use a
broad definition that encompasses both productive and allocative efficiency, and
3Indirect evidence for allocative efficiency is given by Goldman and Smith (2002), Goldman and
Lakdawalla (2005), Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg (2005), and Glied and Lleras-Muney (2008) who
show that higher educated individuals adhere better to, and benefit more from, complex treatments
for HIV and diabetes, and sooner adapt to evolving medical technologies; and Lange (2011) who
shows that higher educated individuals process objective risk factors for cancer into their subjective
probabilities.
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operationalize efficiency of health investment as a lower probability of dying, and a
higher probability of recovery, conditional on being admitted to the hospital.
Theoretical framework To structure thoughts and generate predictions, we pro-
pose a stylized model somewhat similar to Murphy and Topel (2006), in which
individuals maximize a utility function of the form:∫ ∞
t=0
U
{
UH
[
C(t), L(t)
]
, UI
[
C(t), L(t)
]}
P (k)(0, t)e−ρtdt k = 0, 1 (1)
where U [·] is the utility function with inputs from consumption C(t) and leisure
L(t). We envision a model in which utility per period derived from consumption
and leisure is health dependent: UH [·] is the utility when in good health, while UI [·]
is the utility when in ill-health.
We assume that in adulthood there are three different states: (1) being healthy
(H), (2) being ill (hospitalized) (I), and (3) death (D), where utility in death is
normalized to zero. Hence, the matrix of transition probabilities P is a 3 by 3 matrix
where the first row contains the transition probabilities from healthy to healthy, ill,
and death {PHH , PHI , PHD}; the second row contains the transition probabilities
from ill to healthy, ill, and death {PIH , PII , PID}; and no transitions are possible
after death.
We assume that the transition process between the states is a Markov process
and that the transition intensities λ(·) are constant over an age interval of one year.
The transition rates from healthy to ill (λHI), ill to health (λIH), healthy to death
(λHD) and ill to death (λID) jointly comprise a matrix of transition intensities
M(t) =

−(λHI(t) + λHD(t)) λHI(t) λHD(t)
λIH(t) −
(
λIH(t) + λID(t)
)
λID(t)
0 0 0
 (2)
7
In turn, the transition probability matrix from age s to age t is given by
P (s, t) = exp
(
M(s)
)
= V Λ(t− s)V −1 (3)
where V is the matrix of eigenvectors of M(t) and Λ is the exponentiated matrix
of eigenvalues, i.e. if the eigenvalues of M(t) are θ1, θ2 and θ3 = 0 then Λ(t − s) =
diag
(
eθ1(t−s), eθ2(t−s), 1
)
. This implies that the transition probability from ill to
death not only depends on the direct transition rate from ill to death, λID, but
also, in a rather complex way, on the other transition intensities (see Appendix A
for more details).
Hypotheses Following Grossman (1972) and subsequent literature, our first hy-
pothesis is
Hypothesis 1: Education is associated with a higher efficiency of both
curative and preventive types of health investment.
In terms of the theoretical framework, the empirical test for hypothesis 1 requires
comparing the transitions from the state ill across educational groups, and can be
formulated as
E
[
P
(1)
ID (t)− P (0)ID (t)
]
< 0
E
[
P
(1)
IH (t)− P (0)IH (t)
]
> 0 (4)
where P
(1)
ID (t) is the transition probability from ill to death for the higher educated
within a year for an individual aged t, and P
(0)
ID (t) is the same transition probability
for the lower educated. Likewise, P
(k)
IH (t) refers to the transition probability from ill
to healthy for the higher (k = 1) and lower educated (k = 0).4 If higher educated
4The probability to remain in hospital, PII , is the complement of the two probabilities in (4),
and is extremely low since the probability to be in hospital again after exactly one year is very low.
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are more efficient users of health investment, one would expect a smaller probability
to die within a year after becoming ill, PID(t), and a higher probability to recover
within a year, PIH(t), among the higher educated.
It should be noted however that higher educated individuals are generally health-
ier, and less likely to die or become hospitalized, even in the absence of preventive
and curative health investment (e.g. Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008).5 Therefore,
a more stringent test of hypothesis 1 would be comparing the transition rates after
including extensive controls for pre-existing health conditions, demographic charac-
teristics, and the hospital diagnoses. When these factors are included in the matrix
X, hypothesis 1 can be written as:
E
[
P
(1)
ID (t)− P (0)ID (t)
∣∣∣X] < 0
E
[
P
(1)
IH (t)− P (0)IH (t)
∣∣∣X] > 0 (5)
In words, hypothesis (5) entails that for a given hospital diagnosis, a given state of
self-reported health, and conditional on demographics and social background, the
higher educated are more efficient users of health investment (i.e. have a lower
probability of dying conditional on being admitted to the hospital).
Since only a fraction of individuals die in the hospital, it is also informative
to study transitions from the healthy state to future hospitalizations and mortality,
after conditioning on previous hospital diagnoses. This can be interpreted as testing
whether the higher educated are more efficient users of preventive health investment
that make them less likely to die or become hospitalized after recovering from an
5This corresponds to E
[
P
(1)
HD(t)− P (0)HD(t)
]
< 0 and E
[
P
(1)
HH(t)− P (0)HH(t)
]
> 0, which we cannot
reject, see section 5.
9
initial hospitalization:
E
[
P
(1)
HD(t)− P (0)HD(t)
∣∣∣X] < 0
E
[
P
(1)
HH(t)− P (0)HH(t)
∣∣∣X] > 0 (6)
Hypothesis 2: Conditioning on intelligence, education does not improve
the efficiency of health investment
The main innovation of this paper is that we argue that much of the traditional
arguments why education would influence either productive or allocative efficiency
of the health production process also hold for intelligence. Individuals choose their
educational attainment E in adolescence on the basis of their intelligence θ and
other characteristics XE :
E = E
[
θ,XE
]
, (7)
Since both θ and XE may additionally influence the transition probabilities, edu-
cation is endogenous with respect to health investment. The central thesis of this
paper is that the reason why higher educated individuals understand the doctor bet-
ter and understand the dangers of smoking, plausibly derives at least partly from
their better cognitive skills. Therefore we account for intelligence θ in the transition
probabilities, and empirical tests of Hypothesis 2 can be formulated as
E
[
P
(1)
ID (t)− P (0)ID (t)
∣∣∣X, θ] = 0
E
[
P
(1)
IH (t)− P (0)IH (t)
∣∣∣X, θ] = 0
E
[
P
(1)
HD(t)− P (0)HD(t)
∣∣∣X, θ] = 0
E
[
P
(1)
HH(t)− P (0)HH(t)
∣∣∣X, θ] = 0 (8)
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3 Methodology
Our empirical approach is an extension of the structural equation framework de-
veloped by Conti et al. (2010) and Bijwaard et al. (2013). The model allows
a way of modeling the interrelationships between abilities, education and health
outcomes, where individuals make their educational decisions depending on the per-
ceived health gains. Hence, the educational choice is endogenous, and in practice it
is assumed that selection into schooling can be fully accounted for by using observed
characteristics and unobserved intelligence.
The model consists of three parts: (i) a binary educational choice depending on
latent abilities and other covariates, (ii) potential outcomes depending on the choice
of education, latent abilities, and other covariates, and (iii) a measurement system
for the latent abilities.
Educational choice The binary indicator for education Ei is defined as 1 if in-
dividual i took any education beyond primary school, and 0 if not:
Ei =

1 if E∗i ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(9)
where we assume E∗i is an underlying latent utility which is continuous and linear,
and depends on latent intelligence θ, and observed characteristics XE :
E∗i = γX
E
i + αEθi + υiE (10)
with υE being an error term independent of X
E and θ. We assume that υE is
normally distributed, which implies that we have a probit model for the educational
choice. We fix the variance at 1 since the variance is not identified in a probit model.
Multistate potential hazard outcomes The second part is the potential out-
comes part, in which there are two potential outcomes depending on whether the
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individual chose to pursue education beyond primary school or not. These outcomes
are potential because each individual’s transition rate is only observed for the actual
education choice and not for potential alternative. Bijwaard et al. (2013) defined
the potential outcomes in terms of the mortality hazard. Here we extend the model
to a multistate model with transitions from healthy to ill, from ill to healthy and
from both health and ill to death. Healthy is defined as being alive and not in the
hospital, ill is defined as being alive but for more than one day in the hospital as
observed in the hospitalization records, and death is identified through the mortality
register.
For each of the four transition rates we have two potential transition rates: one
for an individual with only primary education (Ei = 0) and one for an individual
with education level beyond primary education (Ei = 1). We define λ
(1)
HD(t) as the
mortality rate from the healthy state for an individual with education level beyond
primary school (Ei = 1), and λ
(0)
HD(t) as the mortality rate from the healthy state
for an individual with an education level equal to primary school (Ei = 0). Similar
definitions are used for the other transition rates.
We assume a Gompertz proportional hazard model in age for the two potential
mortality rates from healthy, which has been shown to be an accurate representation
of mortality between the ages of 30 and 80 (e.g. Gavrilov and Gavrilova, 1991;
Cramer, 2012). Both potential hazards depend on the latent ability θ, and observed
characteristics while healthy XH :
λ
(0)
HD(t|XH , θ) = exp
(
aHD0t+ βHD0X
H
i + αHD0θi
)
λ
(1)
HD(t|XH , θ) = exp
(
aHD1t+ βHD1X
H
i + αHD1θi
)
(11)
with t age in years. The hazard of becoming ill is assumed constant conditional
on the individuals socio-demographics, health and previous health investments cap-
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tured in XH
λ
(0)
HI(t|XH , θ) = exp
(
βHI00 + βHI0X
H
i + αHI0θi
)
λ
(1)
HI(t|XH , θ) = exp
(
βHD10 + βHI1X
H
i + αHI1θi
)
(12)
Since the duration of stay in hospital is never longer than a few months, we define
the transition rates from ill in terms of days in hospital (τ). Both the mortality rate
as well as the recovery rates from the ill-state are assumed to be exponential. Thus,
for k = {H,D} we have the transition rates
λ
(0)
Ik (τ |XI , θ) = exp
(
βIk00 + βHI0X
I
i + αIk0θi
)
λ
(1)
Ik (τ |XI , θ) = exp
(
βIk10 + βHI1X
I
i + αIk1θi
)
(13)
In all the transition rates the effect of latent intelligence on the hazard is captured
by α. We assume a discrete distribution with three points of support for latent
intelligence θl, l = 1, 2, 3. This is similar to including unobserved heterogeneity in
the transition rates that is correlated over the different rates, and for identification
the unobserved heterogeneity needs to have a finite mean. We restrict θ to have
zero mean, i.e.
∑
plθl = 0, where pl is the probability that θ = θl. This restricts
one of the three support-points θ3 and from the restriction that the probabilities pl
sum up to one, the probability p3.
Measurement system for intelligence The final part of the model is the mea-
surement equation, linking the intelligence scores with the latent intelligence, where
one or two measurements, Mik (k = 1, 2), implicitly define latent intelligence θ:
Mik = δkX
M
i + αMkθi + υiMk (14)
with υMk independent of X
M and θ. We assume that υMk is normally distributed
with variance σ2Mk .
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Likelihood function An important feature of duration data is that for some
individuals we only know that he or she survived up to a certain time (often the end
of the observation window). In this case an individual is (right) censored, and we
use the survival function instead of the hazard in the likelihood function. Another
common issue in duration data is that only individuals are observed having survived
up to a certain age. In our case, hospitalization and mortality follow-up are only
available from age 55 onwards. In this case the individuals are left-truncated, and
we need to condition on survival up to the age of first observation, t0. The likelihood
function is given in Appendix B.
After estimating the transition rates in (11), (12), and (13), which depend on
observed and unobserved factors, we calculate the one-year transition probabilities
using the one-to-one translation given by equations (2) and (3). Using the delta-
method and the derivative of the transition matrix we can derive the variance-
covariance of the components of the transition matrix. This allows testing the
theoretical hypotheses 1 (equation 5 and 6) and 2 (equation 8).
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The data are from a Dutch cohort born between 1937 and 1941. The survey was
held in 1952 among 5,823 pupils of the sixth (last) grade of primary schools in
the Dutch province of Noord-Brabant, and hence is referred to as the “Brabant
data”. In 1983 and 1993 attempts to trace all initial respondents of the Brabant-
cohort were made, with overall response rates of around 45 percent. Hartog (1989)
investigated the non-response for the 1983 survey and found no attrition bias in a
wage analysis. Our sample is reduced to 2,998 individuals who have measurements
in 1952 and in either 1983 or 1993, or both. The Brabant data are subsequently
linked to hospitalization records for the years 1995-2005 inclusive, and the mortality
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register and municipality register for the years 1995-2011 inclusive. Given that the
individuals in our sample are born between 1937 and 1941, this implies that we
follow hospitalizations between ages 55 and 68, and mortality from age 55 until 75.6
The hospital discharge register contains data on both inpatient and day care patients
of all general and university hospitals in the Netherlands. Since the administrative
registers are available since 1995, only 86 percent of the 2,998 individuals from 1993
could be traced in the municipality register in 1995, leaving us with a working sample
of 2,579 individuals.
Dependent variables: In the analysis we distinguish between three states.
Individuals are “healthy” if they are alive and non-hospitalized, “ill” if they are
alive but hospitalized for at least one day, and “death” if they are not alive. In our
sample, 409 individuals, or 16 percent, died during the period 1995-2011 (of which
14 percent died in hospital). Average number of hospital stays (with overnight stay)
over the period 1995-2005 is 1, with more than 25 percent of the hospital admissions
due to circulatory problems, 15 percent due to neoplasms, and 11 percent due to
digestive problems.
Independent variables: Our main independent variable of interest is Educa-
tion, defined as the highest level of education attended, in two categories: (1) Pri-
mary Education, including those who attended at most (extended)7 primary school
and (2) Above Primary Education, including those who attended lower vocational
6Of the Dutch population 1940 cohort, only 6.8 percent died between the ages of 12 and 55 –
Human Mortality Database, University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute
for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de
(data downloaded on July 30, 2012).
7At the time, pupils had to stay in school for at least 8 years, or until they reached the age of 14.
Since regular primary school only consisted of 6 grades, some schools offered an additional 2-year
extended primary school (“vglo”).
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education such as the lower agricultural school or lower polytechnic schools, lower
general secondary school, higher general secondary school, and higher vocational
education or university.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and shows that 14 percent did not con-
tinue school after primary school forming the Primary Education category, leaving
86 percent forming the Higher Education category (34 percent attended Lower Vo-
cational Education, 34 percent have General Secondary Education and the other 18
percent attended Higher Vocational or University Education). The lower educated
have a higher mortality before the end of the observation window and they enter
hospital more often. They also remain in hospital for a longer period. The lower
educated are more often admitted for circulatory and respiratory diagnoses, while
the higher educated more often for neoplasms. Figure 1 shows the cumulative inci-
dence curves from the healthy state and from the ill (hospital) state separately for
the two education categories. It is clear that lower educated have a higher incidence
to enter hospital, a smaller incidence to leave hospital, and a higher risk of dying
both in and outside of the hospital.
Our second independent variable is Intelligence. In the Brabant data there
are two separate measurements for intelligence, both measured at age 12: (i) the
Raven Progressive Matrices Test, and (ii) a Vocabulary test (picking synonyms).
The timing of the intelligence test at age 12 avoids possible reverse causality from
education to intelligence (Deary and Johnson, 2010) and allows measuring the clean
impact of childhood intelligence. The IQ p.m. (‘progressive matrices’) test focuses
on mathematical ability and is a replication of the British Progressive Matrices test,
designed by Raven (1958). It is considered to be a ‘pure’ measurement of problem
solving abilities, as it does not require any linguistic or general knowledge (Dronkers,
2002). Table 1 shows that the intelligence test designed by Raven has an average of
102 (96 among the lower educated and 103 among the higher educated).
16
Control variables: The three parts of the empirical model described in section
3 each have their own set of control variables: XE for the educational choice in (10),
XH and XI for the multistate potential outcomes in (11) to (13), and XM for the
measurement system in equation (14).
A fairly standard set of socio-demographic control variables such Age, sex (Male),
Birth Rank, and Family Social Class is included in all models. Family social class
is measured in three categories from lowest to highest depending on father’s occu-
pation.8 We additionally know whether the child had to work in the parent’s farm
or company, defining the binary indicator Child Works.
Factors additionally influencing the measurements of intelligence, XM include
School Type and the Number of Teachers. Additional factors influencing the educa-
tional choice, XE , include Repeat, which defines the number of classes that children
had to repeat, Teacher’s Advice regarding further education of the child, and the
Preference of the Parents concerning the education of the pupil.
Finally, to test whether higher educated individuals are more efficient users of
preventive and curative types of health investments, we intend to keep current health
status and the type of (previous) health investments constant. Therefore, from the
state healthy, the set of control variables XH includes Self-reported health in three
8We classify lower administrative, agricultural, industrial, and other lower workers, and the
disabled into the Lowest Social Class. If the School Principal considered the family “antisocial”,
the family is also classified into the Lowest Social Class. Intermediary personnel, self-employed
farmers, self-employed craftsmen, and the retired are categorized into the Intermediate Social Class
(following Cramer, 2012). Teachers, executives and academics are classified into the Highest Social
Class. In case father’s occupation is missing, we use father’s education for individuals in the 1957
survey. Father’s education is classified into 3 levels, which we directly translate into the three social
classes. We use mother’s education in case the father died or was not present in the household.
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categories (measured in 1993), whether Hospitalized before during the observation
period, and the Last diagnosis in case of a hospitalization (neoplasm, circulatory,
respiratory, or digestive system). From the state ill, the set of control variables XI
includes self-reported health, whether it was a Repeated admittance, whether it was
an Acute admission, and the main diagnosis of the admission (neoplasm, circulatory,
respiratory, or digestive system). The categories of all control variables are defined
in Table 1, which also includes descriptive statistics.
5 Results
In organizing the results, we present three sets of results. The first set of results
corresponds to equation (4) in the theoretical framework, and is based on a model
stratified by education level without any control variables. The second set of results
corresponds to equations (5) and (6) in the theoretical framework, and is based on a
model stratified by education including the control variables defined in section 4 but
assuming education to be exogenous. The third set of results corresponds to equation
(8) in the theoretical framework, and is based on the structural equations (9) to (14)
where we take into account that intelligence influences both the educational choice
and the transition probabilities across the states.
5.1 Basic model without control variables
To get a first impression of the impact of education on the efficiency of health in-
vestment we start with estimating a basic model by education level without any
control variables. The estimated parameters are reported in Table 2. Next, we cal-
culate the implied transition intensities, and using (3) we calculate the transition
probabilities for a one year interval. In Figure 2 the four relevant transition proba-
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bilities are depicted. It is immediately clear that individuals who continued beyond
primary education have a higher (lower) probability to recover (die) within one year
of hospital admittance. From the healthy state, the probability to die within one
year is lower and the probability to remain healthy is higher for higher educated
individuals. This is an indication that our first hypothesis, education improves the
efficiency of health investments in terms of preventive and curative care, holds.
5.2 Stratified model including control variables
The previous analysis ignores that higher educated individuals differ in observed
characteristics and that the diagnosis at hospital admission is simply different across
educational groups. In this subsection we include the control variables discussed in
section 4, but continue to assume that the education choice is exogenous (stratified
models by education level). Table 3 reports all the coefficients, first the transition
rates from healthy and second the transition rates from ill (hospital).
The results indicate that the transition rate from healthy to ill (2nd and 4th
column) is heavily influenced by earlier hospitalizations – the transition rates more
than triple, especially when this was for neoplasm, circulatory or respiratory reasons.
The higher educated are more prone to return to hospital with neoplasms, and less
prone to return for respiratory diseases. Higher educated males are more likely to
(re-)enter hospital compared to high educated females. Poor (self-reported) health in
1993 increases the hospital admission rate. The mortality rates from healthy (3rd and
5th column) are higher for males and are highly affected by previous hospitalizations.
When individuals had cancer at their previous hospitalization their mortality is
five times as high. For the lower educated, respiratory diagnoses also increase the
mortality by a factor five.
The second part of Table 3 reports the parameters of the transition rates out
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of hospital (from the ill state), to either healthy or death. We do not find signifi-
cant gender differences. Higher birth rank reduces the recovery rate for the higher
educated. Again the hospitalization diagnosis plays an important role in explain-
ing the transition rates. Individuals admitted with neoplasms are more likely to
die (especially higher educated) and less likely to recover. Respiratory diseases also
lead to less recovery and higher mortality. An emergency-admittance to the hospital
increases the mortality and decreases the recovery.
Based on these estimates we calculate the transition probabilities for a one year
period, for each education level separately. We derive the difference between the
education groups (and the 95% confidence intervals of the difference) conditional on
the control variables, and depict them in Figure 3. These transition probabilities
show that when accounting for observed differences, the transition probabilities by
education become less distinct and insignificant for young (below 60) people. Still,
individuals with only primary education have a higher (lower) probability to die
(recover) within a year of hospital admittance when they are older than 65. These
individuals also have a higher probability to die within a year when healthy. These
results indicate that education improves the efficiency of health investment, at least
when over 65. Hence, we cannot reject hypothesis 1 and confirm earlier findings
that education is associated with improved efficiency of health investment, both in
terms of preventive and curative care.
5.3 Structural model including intelligence
Next we estimate the full structural model in which both the education choice and
the transition rates depend on latent intelligence. Table 4 reports the parameter
estimates of the structural model. Intelligence plays a major role in explaining the
transition rates from healthy (first row of Table 4). A higher intelligence leads to
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a lower admittance rate for both education groups and a lower death rate for the
higher educated. Another difference with the results from the stratified transition
rates in Table 3 is that the impact of the previous hospital admittance is reduced.
The coefficients of the transition hazards from ill are shown in the second part of
Table 4. Intelligence significantly affects the recovery rate. The other coefficients
are very similar to the estimated coefficients for the transition rates in the stratified
model in Table 3.
In the structural model we also obtain estimates of the education choice (probit)
and the intelligence measurement (linear). The coefficients of these two components
are reported in the third and fourth part of Table 4. Conditional on other observed
characteristics such as parental preference, teacher’s advice, and family socioeco-
nomic status, males were less likely to continue beyond primary school.9 Children
from families with a higher socioeconomic status are significantly more likely to
continue. Strong predictors of educational choice are the teacher’s advice and the
preference of the parents. Children who repeated one or more grades were less likely
to continue. From the second column on intelligence score we deduce that children
from families with a higher socioeconomic status had higher scores, and working
children and children with high birth rank had lower scores. School characteristics
such as the school type and the number of teachers also relate to the test scores.
Based on the estimated coefficients of the structural model we calculate the
transition probabilities for a one year period. The implied differences in transition
probabilities (and the 95% confidence intervals) are depicted in Figure 4. When we
compare these figures with the transition probabilities depicted in Figure 3 we see
that the difference between the two education groups has dropped after accounting
9This is consistent with national trends at that time, as males were more likely to enter general
secondary and higher education, but females were more likely to enter other types of secondary
education, like domestic science school.
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for the effect of intelligence on educational choice and the transitions between states.
Only when the cohort ages beyond 70 we find a significant difference. This implies
that we cannot reject hypothesis 2 up to age 70, while we do reject hypothesis 2
beyond age 70. Overall, the evidence shows that accounting for intelligence removes
most of the difference in the efficiency of health investment between higher and lower
educated individuals, especially at younger ages.
5.4 Heterogeneity
Next we look at a few specific groups and how education affects their efficiency of
health investment. In calculating the transition probabilities we use the estimated
coefficients for some specific groups of both the stratified models and the structural
model. In Figure 5 we depict the transition probabilities from hospital to either
recovery or death for females. The educational gains for females are higher than for
men. We find that even after accounting for intelligence, higher educated females
(older than 70) have a lower probability to die within a year and a higher probability
to recover.
We included four different diagnoses at hospital admission in our model. Figure 6
shows the transition probability to die within one year after admission for these four
different diagnoses.10 Neoplasms and respiratory diseases (COPD, pneumonia) are
both major causes of death. However, the impact of education on mortality of these
diagnoses is very different. When people enter hospital and are diagnosed with
cancer, survival is the same for higher and lower educated. The small efficiency gain
of the higher educated at higher ages is removed after controlling for intelligence.
On the contrary, for respiratory diseases we find a large educational gain of survival
10We do not report the transition probability to recover because they are basically the mirror
image of the transition probability to die, see Figure 4 and Figure 5.
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after hospitalization, especially at later ages, which is only marginally reduced after
controlling for intelligence. A 75 year old individual with only primary education
admitted to hospital with a respiratory diseases has a 12% chance to die within a
year, while a higher educated individual aged 75 years with a respiratory disease has
only 1% chance to die. Digestive and circulatory diseases have much lower mortality
and show only a marginal gain in health efficiency by education.
Finally, we look at the probability to die within a year for individuals admitted to
hospital with acute problems (i.e. entered through the ER). Acute hospitalizations
are unanticipated and have been used before as health shocks (Garcia-Gomez et
al. 2013). In Figure 7 we depict the impact of acute admission to hospital for the
stratified (left) and the structural model (right). For unanticipated health shocks,
the higher educated have a strong survival advantage. At age 75, the one-year
probability to die after an unanticipated health shock is 3 times higher among the
lower educated compared to the higher educated (6% vs. 2%). This difference does
not diminish, and if anything becomes even larger, after accounting for intelligence.
This suggests that when confronted with an unanticipated health shock, the higher
educated are more efficient users of health investment, and we reject hypothesis 2
for this type of hospital admissions.
5.5 Robustness checks
In this section we present a couple of robustness checks, results of which are all avail-
able upon request. First, one may be worried that the variables included in XH and
XI such as self-reported health and (previous) hospital admissions are endogenous
with respect to education. While the inclusion of these variables allows investigating
efficiency gains among the higher educated for a given health status, and a given
hospital diagnosis, one may be worried that the endogeneity of these variables leads
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to a bias in the comparison of transition probabilities across educational groups,
due to the “bad control” problem. Therefore, we re-estimated all models excluding
these potentially endogenous variables, and results are very similar. This suggests
that endogeneity of the variables is a minor issue.
Second, we tested robustness to the definition of the educational choice. While it
is convenient to define a binary indicator of education, we may lose some important
variation across educational levels within the higher educated group. To test this,
we re-define education as comprising four levels, where we split the higher educated
further into lower vocational education, general secondary education, and higher
vocational/university. Figure 8 shows the basic educational disparities in survival
and hospitalizations across four levels of educational attainment, and shows that the
largest disparity is between those attending only primary education and the rest,
while the differences across the other three groups is minimal. This gives comfort
that our binary representation of education is justified.
Third, we have estimated models with more flexible duration dependence in the
transitions between healthy and ill. In the base Gompertz model we assume that
the transitions are constant with respect to age, conditional on the health status
and previous diagnoses of the individual. When estimating piecewise constant mod-
els without the previous diagnoses, the age dependence is positive and statistically
significant. When adding the previous diagnoses, the age dependence of the transi-
tions hazards is very limited, and in some cases even negative. This suggests that
previous diagnoses account for the age-dependence in the transitions, and constant
durations are a reasonable assumption. Importantly, in- or excluding the duration
dependence does not change any of our conclusions.
Finally, apart from the Raven test we have estimated models in which we added
an additional measurement for intelligence, namely the Vocabulary test. Since ef-
ficiency of health investment may in part derive from verbal and communication
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skills, it is worth extending the definition of intelligence to include this component
too. The results prove robust to adding the vocabulary test, suggesting that our
main conclusions hold with the extended definition of intelligence.
6 Discussion
Higher educated individuals are healthier and live longer than their lower educated
peers. In this paper we formulate two testable hypotheses regarding the sources
of these disparities on basis of a theoretical framework that allows for transitions
between healthy, ill and death: (i) education is associated with a higher efficiency
of health investment in terms of both preventive and curative medical care, and (ii)
conditional on intelligence, education does not improve the efficiency of health in-
vestment. We exploit a cohort study among 2,579 individuals with intelligence mea-
sures around age 12 linked to survey information regarding educational attainment,
and administrative records regarding hospitalizations and mortality. The resulting
dataset provides a rare opportunity to test these two theoretical hypotheses.
In line with previous research we find evidence for an association between edu-
cation and the efficiency of health investment: higher educated individuals are less
likely to die during middle-age after a hospitalization. These results hold even for a
given health status and given a certain diagnosis. Hence, we cannot reject our first
hypothesis.
When accounting for the role of intelligence using a structural equation model
in which the education choice and health outcomes are interdependent through
latent intelligence, the association between education and the efficiency of health
investment becomes considerably weaker. Only beyond age 70, the disparities in
survival from the hospital across educational groups become statistically significant
when accounting for the role of intelligence. This suggests that intelligence accounts
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for a substantial proportion of the survival advantage of higher educated individuals,
yet we have to reject our second hypothesis beyond age 70.
Analyses investigating heterogeneity in the effects further suggest that the rela-
tive impact of education compared to intelligence is stronger for females, for unan-
ticipated health shocks, and for respiratory diseases that require complex treatment
such as COPD. Hence, while on average intelligence seems to drive most of the edu-
cational disparities in survival gains, for unanticipated health events and for diseases
that require difficult adherence regimens, education does improve the efficiency of
health investment over and above intelligence.
In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that for most conditions ed-
ucation or learning does not result in survival gains. Instead, intelligence simply
makes the higher educated more efficient users and producers of health investment.
However, for diseases that require complex adherence regimens and for unanticipated
health shocks, education does seem to provide survival benefits. While we cannot
rule out that some non-cognitive abilities such as perseverance and self-control con-
tribute to this educational gain in survival, the results are suggestive that superior
(health) knowledge and other skills taught at school imply a non-monetary return:
enhanced survival probabilities for certain diseases.
When the difference in intelligence is more important than the educational dif-
ferences for the efficiency of health investment, nudging policies that alters people’s
behavior without forcing them (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) may provide health
improvements for all education and intelligence levels. Most people value their
health but persist in behaving in ways that undermine it. For highly intelligent
people it is easier to reflect on their health behavior and adjust it when necessary.
Since nudging can change behavior non-deliberately, thus without using the cogni-
tive system, it could offer new possibilities for encouraging efficient use of health
investment to improve survival chances among the least cognitively able.
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A Transition probabilities
From (2) and (3) we can derive the analytical solution of the transition probabilities:
PHH(s, t) =
1
θ1 − θ2
[
(λHI + λHD + θ1)e
θ2(t−s) − (λHI + λHD + θ2)eθ1(t−s)
]
PII(s, t) =
1
θ1 − θ2
[
(λHI + λHD + θ1)e
θ1(t−s) − (λHI + λHD + θ2)eθ2(t−s)
]
PHI(s, t) =
λHI
θ1 − θ2
[
eθ1(t−s) − eθ2(t−s)
]
PIH(s, t) =
λIH
θ1 − θ2
[
eθ1(t−s) − eθ2(t−s)
]
with two non-zero eigenvalues
θ1 = −1
2
(λHI + λIH + λHD + λID) +
1
2
√
(λHI + λHD − λIH − λID)2 + 4λHIλIH
θ2 = −1
2
(λHI + λIH + λHD + λID)− 1
2
√
(λHI + λHD − λIH − λID)2 + 4λHIλIH
and
θ1 − θ2 =
√
(λHI + λHD − λIH − λID)2 + 4λHIλIH
The probability to die at age t, the transition to death, is 1− PHH(s, t)− PHI(s, t)
for an individual who is healthy at s and 1− PIH(s, t)− PII(s, t) for an individual
ill at s.
Kalbfleisch et al. (1983) derive the derivatives of P (t) (provided that θ1 6= θ2 6=
0). For k ∈ {HI,HD, IH, ID} we have
∂P (s, t)
∂λk
= V GkV
−1 (A.1)
where Gk(t) is and 3 x 3 matrix with (i, j)th element is M
(k)
ij times Aij(s, t) with
A(s, t) =

(t− s)eθ1(t−s) eθ1(t−s)−eθ2(t−s)θ1−θ2 0
eθ1(t−s)−eθ2(t−s)
θ1−θ2 (t− s)eθ2(t−s) 0
0 0 0

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and M
(k)
ij is the (i, j)th element of V
−1(∂M/∂λk)V . The ∂M/∂λk matrices are very
simple. e.g.
∂M
∂λID
=

0 0 0
0 −1 1
0 0 0

B Likelihood
The likelihood contribution of the first spell (either healthy to illness or healthy to
death) for individual i, who is only observed (left-truncated) after ti0, is given by
Li1 =
∫ [
Φ
(
γXEi + αEθ
) · λ(1)HI(ti|XH , θ)∆HIiλ(1)HD(ti|XH , θ)∆HDi ·
S
(1)
H (ti|X, θ)/S(1)H (ti0|X, θ)
]Ei
×
[
Φ
(
−γXEi − αEθ
)
· λ(0)HI(ti|XH , θ)∆HIiλ(0)HD(ti|XH , θ)∆HDi ·
S
(0)
H (ti|X, θ)/S(0)H (ti0|X, θ)
]1−Ei 1
σM
φ
(Mi − δ1XMi − αMθ
σM
)
dH(θ|T > ti0)
with ∆HIi = 1 if individual i enters hospital before dying and ∆HDi = 1 if individual
i dies before entering hospital. The ‘total’ survival of individual i, the probability
that he survives and stays out of hospital up till age ti is
S
(k)
H (t|X, θ) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λ
(k)
HI(s|XH , θ) + λ(k)HD(s|XH , θ) ds
)
k = 0, 1
The distribution of the latent skills conditional on survival up to ti0 is
dH(θ|T > ti0) =
Φ
(
γXEi + αEθ
)
S
(1)
H (ti0|X, θ) + Φ
(−γXEi − αEθ)S(0)H (ti0|X, θ)h(θ)∫
Φ
(
γXEi + αEθ
)
S
(1)
H (ti0|X, θ) + Φ
(−γXEi − αEθ)S(0)H (ti0|X, θ)h(θ) dθ
The second spell in the multistate model (only for those who have not died) is either
from illness back to healthy or from illness to death. Let τi1 = t2i − t1i, the time
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since entry to the hospital. Then, the likelihood contribution of the second spell is
Li2 =∫
f2(τi1|ti1, X, θ)
[
Φ
(
γXEi + αEθ
)
S
(1)
H (ti1|X, θ) + Φ
(−γXEi − αEθ)S(0)H (ti1|X, θ)]h(θ) dθ∫ [
Φ
(
γXEi + αEθ
)
S
(1)
H (ti1|X, θ) + Φ
(−γXEi − αEθ)S(0)H (ti1|X, θ)]h(θ) dθ
with
fi2(τi1|ti1, X, θ) =[
λ
(1)
IH(τi1|XI , ti1, θ)∆IHiλ(1)ID(τi1|XI , ti1, θ)∆IDiS(1)I (ti2|X, θ)/S(1)I (ti1|X, θ)
]Ei
×
[
λ
(0)
IH(τi1|XI , ti1, θ)∆IHiλ(0)ID(τi1|XI , ti1, θ)∆IDiS(0)I (ti2|X, θ)/S(0)I (ti1|X, θ)
]1−Ei
with ∆IHi = 1 if individual i leaves hospital before dying and ∆IDi = 1 if individual
i dies in hospital and for k = 0, 1
S
(k)
I (ti2|X, θ) = S(k)H (ti1|X, θ) exp
(
−
∫ ti1
ti1
λ
(k)
IH(s|XI , θ) + λ(k)ID(s|XI , θ) ds
)
The (possible) third spell in the multistate model is either from healthy back to
illness or from healthy to death. Then, the likelihood contribution of the third spell
is
Li3 =
∫
f3(ti3|θ)
[
Φ
(
γXEi + αEθ
)
S(1)(ti2|X, θ) + Φ
(−γXEi − αEθ)S(0)(ti2|X, θ)]h(θ) dθ∫ [
Φ
(
γXEi + αEθ
)
S(1)(ti2|X, θ) + Φ
(−γXEi − αEθ)S(0)(ti2|X, θ)]h(θ) dθ
with
f3(ti3|ti2, X, θ) =[
λ
(1)
HI(ti3|X, θ)∆HIiλ(1)HD(ti3|X, θ)∆HDiS(1)(ti3|X, θ)/S(1)(ti2|X, θ)
]Ei
×
[
λ
(0)
HI(ti3|X, θ)∆HIiλ(0)HD(ti3|X, θ)∆HDiS(0)(ti3|X, θ)/S(0)(ti2|X, θ)
]1−Ei
∆HIi = 1 if individual i enters (for the second time) hospital before dying and
∆HDi = 1 if individual i dies before entering hospital (for the second time) and for
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k = 0, 1
S(k)(ti3|X, θ) = S(k)I (ti2|X, θ)
S
(k)
HI(ti3|X, θ)
S
(k)
HI(ti2|X, θ)
S
(k)
HD(ti3|X, θ)
S
(k)
HD(ti2|X, θ)
The likelihood contributions for fourth and later spells are similar. The full likeli-
hood (of individual i) is the product of all these terms, Li1, Li2, Li3, etc.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by education level
Primary Above primary All
14% 86%
Mortality
Died 23% 15% 16%
% of which died in hospital 16% 12% 14%
Hospitalization
# Hospital stays 1.1 0.9 0.9
Emergency entry 49% 43% 44%
Length of stay (days) 10.2 9.3 9.7
Intelligence
Raven p.m. test 96.29 103.05 102.04
Vocabulary test 94.16 102.73 101.42
Diagnosis at admission
Neoplasm 11% 16% 15%
Circulatory 30% 25% 26%
Respiratory 11% 4% 5%
Digestive 12% 11% 11%
Control variables
Male 61% 58% 58%
Birth Rank 2.82 2.44 2.50
Family Socioeconomic Status1
Lowest 66% 47% 49%
Middle 23% 45% 41%
Highest 0% 3% 3%
Child Works 37% 22% 24%
School Religion1
Roman-Catholic 82% 74% 74%
Protestant 14% 19% 19%
Public 4% 7% 7%
Number of Teachers 6.68 6.95 6.92
Repeat1
No Repetition of Grade 33% 66% 61%
Repeated Once 37% 24% 26%
Repeated Twice or More 24% 6% 8%
Teacher’s Advice1
Continue Primary School 49% 18% 23%
Lower Vocational Education 37% 35% 36%
Lower Secondary Education 3% 27% 23%
Higher Secondary Education 1% 15% 13%
Preference of the Parents1
Work in Family Company 16% 10% 11%
Paid Work without Vocational Education 33% 7% 10%
Paid Work with Vocational Education 11% 6% 7%
General Secondary Education 19% 65% 58%
1 Due to missings, percentages do not add up to 100% within Family social class, school religion,
repeat, teacher’s advice and preference of the parents
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Table 2: Parameter estimates simple (no covariates included) stratified model by
education level
Primary education Above primary
from healthya to ill to death to ill to death
(log) constant −2.209 −12.609 −2.496 −12.122
(0.050) (1.794) (0.023) (0.846)
age − 0.126 − 0.112
(0.027) (0.013)
from illb to healthy to death to healthy to death
(log) constant −2.357 −5.748 −2.255 −6.032
(0.051) (0.277) (0.023) (0.152)
a Duration time from healthy is years since birth.
b Duration time from ill is days since hospital admission.
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Table 3: Parameter estimates stratified model by education level
Primary education Above primary
from healthya to ill to death to ill to death
Male −0.212 0.727∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.717∗∗
(0.109) (0.289) (0.049) (0.137)
Child is working - base is “No”
Yes 0.071 0.124 0.136+ 0.240
(0.114) (0.272) (0.055) (0.147)
Missing −0.352 −1.124 −0.114 0.181
(0.213) (0.617) (0.083) (0.200)
Family Socioeconomic Status - base is “Low”
Middle −0.084 −0.097 −0.040 0.135
(0.133) (0.328) (0.049) (0.128)
High −0.084 −0.097 0.217 0.540
(0.133) (0.328) (0.131) (0.318)
Missing −0.492+ −0.787 0.013 0.377
(0.244) (0.674) (0.123) (0.318)
Birthrank - base is “First”
Second 0.175 −0.589 0.016 −0.130
(0.185) (0.409) (0.071) (0.176)
Third or Fourth 0.453∗∗ −0.328 0.026 −0.195
(0.165) (0.375) (0.066) (0.167)
Fifth or higher 0.385+ −0.074 0.073 −0.312
(0.170) (0.357) (0.065) (0.171)
Missing 0.768∗∗ 0.848 0.027 −0.681
(0.292) (0.655) (0.131) (0.374)
Health status in 1993 - base is “good”
Poor health 0.419∗∗ −0.604 0.445∗∗ 0.317
(0.149) (0.519) (0.066) (0.189)
Missing −0.121 0.420 0.042 0.186
(0.123) (0.294) (0.053) (0.137)
Hospitalization and last diagnosis
Has been in hospital 1.194∗∗ 0.663+ 1.351∗∗ 0.988∗∗
(0.135) (0.299) (0.056) (0.142)
Neoplasm 0.789∗∗ 1.576∗∗ 1.109∗∗ 1.659∗∗
(0.218) (0.537) (0.082) (0.176)
Circulatory 0.404∗∗ 0.114 0.444∗∗ 0.302
(0.161) (0.428) (0.071) (0.187)
Respiratory 1.047∗∗ 1.696∗∗ 0.475∗∗ 0.143
(0.208) (0.491) (0.141) (0.421)
Digestive 0.148 −0.060 −0.155 −0.186
(0.207) (0.557) (0.110) (0.278)
(log) constant −2.992 −13.325 −3.318 −11.584
(0.189) (1.933) (0.069) (0.902)
Age − 0.125 − 0.087
(0.028) (0.014)
a Duration time from healthy is years since birth.
+p < 0.05 and ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 3: Parameter estimates stratified model by education level (continued)
Primary education Above primary
from illb to healthy to death to healthy to death
Male −0.100 −0.124 0.092 0.128
(0.114) (0.589) (0.050) (0.335)
Child is working - base is “No”
Yes −0.428∗∗ 0.299 0.077 −0.736
(0.117) (0.650) (0.056) (0.453)
Missing 0.072 −0.017 −0.069 −1.081
(0.220) (1.162) (0.085) (0.667)
Birthrank - base is “First”
Second 0.059 − −0.071 −0.918+
(0.194) (0.072) (0.451)
Third or Fourth 0.004 − −0.169∗∗ −0.009
(0.177) (0.067) (0.491)
Fifth or higher 0.007 − −0.201∗∗ 0.261
(0.183) (0.065) (0.461)
Missing −0.190 − −0.380∗∗ 0.664
(0.273) (0.122) (0.844)
Health status in 1993 - base is “good”
Poor health 0.077 0.274 −0.172∗∗ −0.204
(0.129) (0.630) (0.064) (0.435)
Previous hospitalization and last diagnosis
Repeated admittance −0.036 1.127 −0.110+ 0.556
(0.107) (0.783) (0.047) (0.338)
Neoplasm −0.331 1.419+ −0.313∗∗ 2.695∗∗
(0.187) (0.657) (0.069) (0.502)
Circulatory 0.044 0.645 −0.033 0.692
(0.139) (0.796) (0.061) (0.580)
Respiratory −0.413+ − 0.145 1.545∗∗
(0.200) (0.118) (0.739)
Digestive 0.069 − 0.263∗∗ −1.317
(0.168) (0.079) (0.675)
Acute −0.428∗∗ 1.270 −0.365∗∗ 1.410∗∗
(0.106) (0.778) (0.049) (0.361)
(log) constant −1.772 −8.183 −1.912 −8.736
(0.211) (1.158) (0.072) (0.709)
a Duration time from ill is days since hospital admission.
+p < 0.05 and ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: Parameter estimates structural model by education level
Primary education Above primary
from healthya to ill to death to ill to death
Intelligence −0.537∗∗ −0.142 −0.561∗∗ −0.649∗∗
(0.159) (0.137) (0.161) (0.196)
Male −0.256 0.750∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.717∗∗
(0.147) (0.301) (0.067) (0.137)
Child is working - base is “No”
Yes 0.315 0.160 0.076 0.756∗∗
(0.164) (0.282) (0.073) (0.151)
Missing 0.072 −2.005+ 0.003 0.261
(0.319) (0.789) (0.114) (0.160)
Family Socioeconomic Status - base is “Low”
Middle −0.029 −0.035 −0.224∗∗ −0.012
(0.184) (0.339) (0.065) (0.142)
High −0.029 −0.035 0.198 0.487
(0.184) (0.339) (0.195) (0.371)
Missing −0.698+ −0.462 0.010 0.535
(0.328) (0.661) (0.153) (0.334)
Birthrank - base is “First”
Second 0.758+ −0.355 0.107 −0.011
(0.302) (0.440) (0.096) (0.192)
Third or Fourth 1.034∗∗ −0.117 0.105 −0.157
(0.286) (0.413) (0.085) (0.183)
Fifth or higher 0.659+ 0.073 0.113 −0.343
(0.265) (0.383) (0.086) (0.189)
Missing 1.368∗∗ 1.375+ −0.103 −0.835+
(0.437) (0.651) (0.166) (0.396)
Health status in 1993 - base is “good”
Poor health 0.739∗∗ −0.352 0.463∗∗ 0.350
(0.221) (0.535) (0.089) (0.204)
Missing −0.158 0.590 0.077 0.160
(0.174) (0.318) (0.069) (0.150)
Hospitalization and last diagnosis
Has been in hospital 0.397+ 0.364 0.849∗∗ 0.278
(0.203) (0.369) (0.071) (0.171)
Neoplasm 1.151∗∗ 1.871∗∗ 1.184∗∗ 2.073∗∗
(0.254) (0.553) (0.100) (0.188)
Circulatory 0.555∗∗ 0.104 0.636∗∗ 0.732∗∗
(0.185) (0.438) (0.083) (0.198)
Respiratory 0.248 1.663∗∗ 0.254 0.204
(0.272) (0.545) (0.181) (0.449)
Digestive 0.394 0.168 −0.053 −0.102
(0.245) (0.560) (0.124) (0.288)
(log) constant −3.779 −15.990 −3.396 −14.901
(0.366) (2.164) (0.088) (1.069)
Age − 0.159 − 0.137
(0.031) (0.016)
a Duration time from healthy is years since birth.
+p < 0.05 and ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: Parameter estimates structural model by education level (continued)
Primary education Above primary
from illb to healthy to death to healthy to death
Intelligence 0.092+ 0.238 0.116∗∗ 0.129
(0.044) (0.183) (0.038) (0.138)
Male −0.062 0.062 0.056 0.095
(0.116) (0.594) (0.051) (0.336)
Child is working - base is “No”
Yes −0.494∗∗ 0.246 0.084 −0.669
(0.121) (0.657) (0.057) (0.459)
Missing −0.068 −0.320 0.045 −0.999
(0.229) (1.179) (0.087) (0.669)
Birthrank - base is “First”
Second −0.066 − −0.100 0.829
(0.205) (0.074) (0.458)
Third or Fourth −0.096 − −0.176∗∗ −0.030
(0.185) (0.069) (0.493)
Fifth or higher −0.045 − −0.187∗∗ 0.214
(0.187) (0.067) (0.462)
Missing −0.288 − −0.330∗∗ 0.593
(0.279) (0.123) (0.847)
Health status in 1993 - base is “good”
Poor health −0.153 0.079 −0.196∗∗ −0.270
(0.135) (0.669) (0.066) (0.440)
Previous hospitalization and last diagnosis
Repeated admittance 0.127 1.562 0.073 0.736
(0.124) (0.845) (0.055) (0.389)
Neoplasm −0.297 1.534+ −0.263∗∗ 2.740∗∗
(0.188) (0.670) (0.071) (0.504)
Circulatory 0.047 0.436 −0.074 0.648
(0.139) (0.793) (0.061) (0.581)
Respiratory −0.309 − 0.178 1.572+
(0.203) (0.120) (0.738)
Digestive 0.030 − 0.247∗∗ 1.288
(0.171) (0.080) (0.676)
Acute −0.406∗∗ 1.352 −0.340∗∗ 1.458∗∗
(0.107) (0.779) (0.049) (0.368)
(log) constant −1.576 −7.983 −1.837 −8.626
(0.228) (1.157) (0.074) (0.715)
b Duration time from ill is days since hospital admission.
+p < 0.05 and ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: Parameter estimates structural model by education level (continued)
Educationc Raven testd
Intelligence 0.137+ 1
(0.063)
Male −0.252∗∗ −0.887
(0.083) (0.528)
Child is working - base is “No”
Yes −0.207+ −3.767∗∗
(0.091) (0.627)
Missing −0.281+ −1.103
(0.137) (0.899)
Family Socioeconomic Status - base is “Low”
Middle 0.361∗∗ 2.570∗∗
(0.094) (0.543)
High 0.396 4.242∗∗
(0.453) (1.636)
Missing −0.511∗∗ −4.342∗∗
(0.175) (1.294)
Birthrank - base is “First”
Second −0.137 0.468
(0.122) (0.785)
Third or Fourth −0.074 −0.263
(0.113) (0.733)
Fifth or higher −0.057 −3.053∗∗
(0.111) (0.729)
Missing 0.104 −0.654
(0.304) (1.469)
School religion - base is “Catholic”
Protestant 0.311∗∗ 0.626
(0.106) (0.682)
Other 0.388+ 5.051∗∗
(0.195) (1.124)
Number of teachers - base is “5-8 teachers”
≤ 4 −0.147 −3.837∗∗
(0.100) (0.725)
9-12 0.058 0.410
(0.096) (0.631)
Missing 0.314 0.843
(0.215) (1.298)
Constant 2.109 3.621
(0.206) (0.741)
c Education choice probit model.
d IQ-measurement linear model, centered around
IQ = 100.
+p < 0.05 and ∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: Parameter estimates structural model by education level (continued)
Educationc Raven testd θ
Teacher’s advice - base is “Lower vocational school”
Continued primary school −0.264∗∗
(0.090)
Lower general secondary school 0.459∗∗
(0.165)
Higher general secondary school 0.538+
(0.255)
Missing −0.543+
(0.250)
Repeat grade - base is “None”
Once −0.295∗∗
(0.087)
Twice −0.709∗∗
(0.118)
Missing 0.751
(0.411)
Preference of the parents - base is “Only vocational education”
Work in own company −0.885∗∗
(0.190)
Work without education −1.357∗∗
(0.185)
Work with education −0.921∗∗
(0.198)
General secondary school −0.345
(0.179)
Missing −0.923∗∗
(0.184)
Distribution of θ
θ1 −5.310
(1.525)
θ2 0.426
(0.129)
θ3 −2.628
(0.758)
p1 0.012
(0.003)
p2 0.871
(0.002)
p3 0.118
(0.015)
c Education choice probit model.
d IQ-measurement linear model.
+p < 0.05 and ∗∗p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Cumulative incidence by education level
44
55 60 65 70 75
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
age
Tr
a
n
si
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Ill 
to
 d
ea
th
Primary
Above primary
55 60 65 70 75
0.
90
0.
92
0.
94
0.
96
0.
98
1.
00
age
Tr
a
n
si
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
Ill 
to
 h
ea
lth
y
Primary
Above primary
PID PIH
55 60 65 70 75
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
age
Tr
a
n
si
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
he
al
th
y 
to
 d
ea
th
Primary
Above primary
55 60 65 70 75
0.
90
0.
92
0.
94
0.
96
0.
98
1.
00
age
Tr
a
n
si
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 h
ea
lth
y
Primary
Above primary
PHD PHH
Figure 2: Transition probability over a one year period (and the 95% confidence
intervals) by age and education level (model without covariates)
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Figure 3: Transition probability over a one year period (and the 95% confidence
intervals) by age and education level (stratified model)
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Figure 4: Transition probability over a one year period (and the 95% confidence
intervals) by age and education level (structural model)
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Figure 5: Transition probability over a one year period (and the 95% confidence
intervals) from hospital by education level (stratified and structural model): FE-
MALES
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Figure 6: Transition probability from hospital to death over a one year period by
age and education level (stratified and structural model): DIAGNOSES49
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Figure 7: Transition probability from hospital to death over a one year period by
age and education level (stratified/structural model): ACUTE
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Figure 8: Transition probability over a one year period (and the 95% confidence
intervals) by age and FOUR education levels (model without covariates)
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